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Japanese Corporate Governance at a Crossroads:
Variation in 'Varieties of Capitalism'?'
Luke Nottage
I. Revisiting 'Varieties of Capitalism': Corporate Governance as Stakeholder Contracts
II. Shareholders as Primary Stakeholders
III. Creditors, Recession, and Financial Market Deregulation
IV. Employees and the Vicissitudes of the Labour Market
V. Conflicting Tendencies in Industrial Production and the State?
VI. Conclusions
Abstract: Over the last decade or so, elaborate theoretical and empirical analyses of 'varieties 
of capitalism' have been developed, mainly to contrast Anglo-American models with those in 
East Asia and - especially - Europe. Corporate governance, broadly defined as relations among 
a range of stakeholders in firms, provides a useful focal point in testing and refining these 
analyses, especially in relation to Japan and the issue of convergence or divergence on Anglo- 
American'models. Parts ll-IV of this paper apply principal-agent theory to identify problems 
arising from incomplete information and possible opportunism among managers, shareholders, 
creditors and employees. It finds considerable realignment of manager and shareholder 
interests, even more change to Japan's main bank system of corporate governance, and less 
obvious - but significant - transformations in employment relations. Although differences are 
therefore apparent in these three major components of corporate governance, the degree of 
convergence towards more arm's length control mechanisms characteristic of Anglo-American 
models is more pronounced than expected by some theorists of 'varieties of capitalism'. 
However, Part V suggests that more cooperative relations may continue to prevail at the level 
of industrial production in Japan, premised on expansive information-sharing and participation, 
in turn suggesting that more than opportunism is at work. The Japanese state may also be 
moving in this directibn, implying a more positive assessment of seemingly indecisive policy­
making over the last decade. This could further set the stage for new forms of corporate 
governance to emerge, similarly characterised by forthright information-sharing among new 
stakeholder participants. Key issues are therefore whether Japan as a whole is moving towards 
more openness in information flows and participation by various socio-economic groups, and 
whether this is driven purely by concerns about opportunism or by other normative 
considerations. These issues are common to the US and Britain as well, suggesting a deeper 
level of convergence in Japan. But how they are resolved could well play out quite differently,
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leaving important divergences. In th is conclusion, and generally by suggesting some possible 
tensions as well as coherence among im portant dim ensions of contem porary capitalist 
systems, th is paper therefore questions some other tenets of Varie ties of capita lism ' theories 
developed so far.
‘The numbers coming out of Tokyo do not lie. Unemployment and bankruptcies are at their 
post-1940s peak. GNP shrank in 1998, and the poor third-quarter numbers for 1999 suggest 
that the high growth rates recorded in the first half of the year were indeed, as many had 
feared, simply the one-off products of huge dollops of public spending rather than signals of 
any fundamental turnaround. Repeated attempts to jumpstart the Japanese economy with 
such spending have saddled the country with a government deficit which, as a percentage of 
GNP, is among the highest in the OECD. The Tokyo Stock Exchange languished for a decade 
in the grip of one of the most vicious and protracted bear markets of the century; even the 
recovery that set in early in 1999 is simply taking it back to levels that a few years ago would 
have been regarded as disastrously low. Real estate prices have fallen to more than 60 per 
cent from their late 1980s peak, with no floor in sight; most of the nation’s banks would be 
insolvent if Japan followed Western accounting standards. And to top it off, we have seen over 
the past year spikes in both interest rates and the yen. While interest rates have come back 
down, the forces that led to the spikes are still there: if higher interest rates return or the yen 
does not soon weaken, a range of Japanese manufacturers that have been kept alive since the 
mid-nineties on the life support of a weak currency and extremely low interest rates will not 
survive.
Yet the sense remains that, irrespective of whatever political difficulties may stand 
in the way of getting the country moving again, Japan’s policy elite doesn’t really think things 
are that bad. ...
Taken together, Tokyo’s policy moves paint a portrait of befuddlement, uncertainty, 
and serious internal rifts. Banking crises are the financial equivalent of fires: one expects 
alarm, panic, firemen rushing to the scene; what one doesn’t expect are groups of obviously 
capable firemen standing around debating whether there really is or isn’t a fire; if there is, 
should we be using water to put it out, or might we run out of water, so maybe it would be 
better to try one of those new chemical extinguishers -  except that the bill for that would be too 
high? In the meantime, a whole field of bystanders jumps up and down shouting, ‘Put out the 
bloody fire before it burns our houses too!’. So the firemen feel they must look busy but don’t 
really do much.”
[Murphy 2000: 27-28, 30]
I. Revisiting ‘Varieties of Capitalism’: Corporate Governance as
Stakeholder Contracts
Poor economic performance in the United States over the 1980s led to intriguing 
attempts to reconceptualise the essential elements of successful capitalism through 
comparative analysis. Some theorists examined economic achievements and 
structures in Japan and East Asia, but considerable collaborative research focused 
more on developments in Europe. One influential strand in the latter research argued 
that markets were only one institutional mechanism for coordinating economic activity, 
and that all these mechanisms were shaped by and shapers of "social systems of 
production (SSPs)", meaning:
The way that the following institutions or structures of a region or structures of a country or a 
region are integrated into a social configuration: the industrial relations system; the system of 
training of workers and managers; the internal structure of corporate firms; the structured 
relationships among,firms in the same industry on the one hand, and on the other firms' 




























































































conceptions of fairness and justice held by capital and labor; the structure of the state and its 
policies; and a society's idiosyncratic customs and traditions as well as its norms, moral 
principles, rules, and recipes for action.
[Hollingsworth & Boyer 1997: 3]
It was argued that "all these institutions, organizations, and social values tend to 
cohere with each other, although they vary in the degree to which they are tightly 
coupled with each other into a fully fledged system". Accordingly, this new theoretical 
paradigm tended to stress the likely limits to change in national SSPs. There was 
particular skepticism about convergence on Anglo-American (especially US) systems 
centred on markets for standardised goods as primary coordinating mechanisms. 
Initial restatements acknowledged the limits of this paradigm to explain why such 
"configurations occur within a particular place and time" [idem], but were more 
ambitious in contending that no particular new configuration would emerge even 
amidst globalisation.
A key argument was that there was "no single method whereby ... SSPs can 
always be competitive", because no single system could be "always superior in all its 
components with respect to any alternative system" [Boyer & Hollingsworth 1997: 
455]. Instead, the superiority of a SSP was seen to be "shaped not only by its 
institutional arrangements but also by that of its competitors, as well as the 
macroeconomic context in which it was embedded" [ibid: 456]. While agreeing that the 
"Fordist" SSP (based on standardised mass production) was being displaced, 
individual researchers in this project differed as to more important likely successors: 
"customised production" (eg fashion apparel), "diversified quality mass production" (eg 
automobiles), "flexible diversified quality mass production" (eg consumer electronics), 
or "adaptive production" (successful where technical change is fastest, eg 
pharmaceuticals or software) [ibid: 457, Figure 14-5]. Different sectors face variable 
technological and other constraints influencing adoption of SSPs, but it was argued 
more generally that "the general context within which a [SSP] is located influences the 
degree of the competitiveness of each SSP, in such a manner that the superiority of 
any [SSP] is context dependent" [ibid: 458]. Each SSP thus required a "variable mix of 
markets, networks, associations and hierarchies" [ibid: 459 (Table 14-1)] These 
coordinating mechanisms were thought not to be easily transplantable, because the 
social processes resulting in SSPs were quite historically specific [ibid: 461]. This 
research therefore concluded that ready globalisation was undermined not only by 
empirical phenomena such as persistent divergence in interest rates world-wide, 
enduring production niches, and technology diffusion reliant on "learning by doing", 
but also by more theoretical considerations:
The coexistence of different [SSPs] is more likely than their convergence. Obviously it is quite 
logical for actors to provide different solutions to problems when they face different training 
systems, industrial relations systems, interest rates, real wages, public infrastructures, and tax 
and credit systems. But even if all these systems were the same, different norms, rules and 
value systems would still lead actors to provide different solutions to identical issues. For 
example, the training of workers is organized quite differently in Germany, Japan and Sweden, 
but nevertheless these three economies benefit from a good skills portfolio. Differences in 
historical traditions lead to variability in norms and rules that produce different solutions to the 
same problems
[ibid: 463; cf also eg Jackson 1999 = forthcoming].
The expansive scope of inquiry may have predisposed this theory to stress 
differences and divergence [cf generally Nottage 2001b], but this was arguably 




























































































Subsequent research along these lines developed even more ambitious 
frameworks of analysis to distinguish Anglo-American systems, while attempting to 
incorporate further empirical data. An influential reformulation proposed by Kitschelt et 
al [1999: 429] adapts David Soskice's distinction between "liberal market economies" 
(LMEs) and "coordinated market economies” (CMEs), turning on whether businesses 
coordinate their interactions primarily with spot-market contracts, as opposed to 
“mechanisms of generalized exchange or resource pooling and hierarchical 
coordination among firms and business associations" allowing employers to produce 
collective goods. They acknowledge that considerable differentiation exists among 
CMEs, but are most concerned with those European economies primarily coordinated 
at the national level (notably in Scandinavia) versus the sectoral or industry level 
("Rhine" capitalist countries such as Germany or Belgium). Both sub-groups differ 
from “the Anglo-Saxon world of competitive market capitalism where employers are 
rarely able to produce collective goods through horizontal or vertical coordination", a 
distinction seemingly more important than "mixed cases" such as France and Italy, 
lying "between LMEs and industry-coordinated CMEs”.1
Kitschelt et al [idem] also follow Soskice in acknowledging a further possible 
sub-group of CME, "coordination among groups of companies across industries in 
Japan and Korea (group coordinated market economies)", but pay only limited 
attention to them in their subsequent analysis. Yet Japan re-appears in passing when 
they try to correlate types of capitalism with “political organization": Japan has a 
"residual welfare state", like "uncoordinated LMEs", but one which is - paradoxically - 
also "paternalistic" [ibid: 434, Figure 15.1]. Japan also figures in a category of its own, 
unexplored, when Kitschelt et al [ibid: 435, Table 15.2] attempt to support these 
further qualitative parameters with a range of measures determining the welfare state 
and social inequality associated with each form of capitalism. On these indicators, 
Japan might be located overall between the LMEs and sectoral CMEs - and certainly 
in a world apart from the national CMEs - but it makes the taxonomy itself begins to 
appear rather problematic.
This difficulty also surfaces when Japan is added to the three main 
categories, viewed in terms of unemployment and growth rates since the 1960s [ibid: 
436, Table 15.3]. Nonetheless, the figures for Japan reveal a parallel decline in 
economic performance since the 1970s, implying that it is being subjected to the 
major transformations categorizing the other types of capitalist economy aS'analysed 
by Kitschelt et al. They find unfounded the neo-liberal argument of convergence 
towards minimal political control in allocating resources (or non-market coordination). 
Instead, (1) nationally coordinated CMEs have moved quite decisively in that direction 
since the 1980s, but still retain significantly more political control than most sectorally 
coordinated CMEs; (2) the latter have not moved significantly in that direction, and 
indeed may exhibit now more variety in solutions along this overall parameter; (3) so 
do now LMEs, despite notable decreases overall in political control over economic 
allocation of resources [ibid: 444, Figure 15.2]. Reincorporating Japan into this picture 
as a hybrid, with elements from the latter two categories, implies skepticism about the 
possibility that it may be moving rapidly towards a LME model as predicted by neo­
liberal economic theory. This accords with the earlier express analysis of Japanese
Rhodes and Apeldoorn (1998: 408-411] highlight key differences between "Germanic" and 
"Latin" economies, which they characterize as "network-oriented" in terms of institutional context and 
corporate features (arguably corresponding to CMEs), in distinction to "market-oriented Anglo-Saxon" 




























































































developments by Hollingsworth [1997], based on joint research underpinned by the 
SSP paradigm outlined above, and a more recent analysis of the historical roots of 
capitalist organisation in both Germany and Japan [Jackson 1999 = forthcoming].
Weiss [1998] .broadly follows these lines of argument. She contends that 
many major economies other than Britain and the US have strong states with actual or 
potential “transformative capacity” in advancing socio-economic welfare, which will 
survive the onslaught of market forces world-wide. Most prominent examples given 
are from East Asia, especially Japan, where "governed interdependence" between 
government and business has arguably developed the richest variety of forms [ibid: 
69-79]: "disciplined support" (eg subsidies for exports or tariff barriers, given to sectors 
only in exchange for improved economic performance), "public risk absorption" (to 
solicit cooperation of producers in new industries), "private sector governance" 
(industrial policy delegated to initiatives of industries, especially those in decline), and 
“public-private innovation alliances" (to develop and diffuse technology). These 
features of East Asian economies are characterised as the “socialization of producer 
risk", promoting industrial growth and transformation which is expected to provide 
increasingly high-value added employment. By contrast, “socialization of costs to 
employees" in corporatist Scandinavia aims at strong social welfare protection for 
those adversely affected by economic change in exchange for containing costs. This 
may not be enough to retain international competitiveness, Weiss suggests, which 
appears consistent with the pressures towards large transformations there since the 
1980s also identified by Kritschelt et al. She sees more potential for Japan and 
Germany, with more balanced developmental and distributive capacities. Germany 
has also promoted industrial transformations through state intervention, although 
arguably less pervasively, while Japan exhibits more concern for distributive issues 
than indicated by aggregate data, through disproportionately important agricultural 
policy, sunset industry policies, legal and de facto measures to support employment, 
and significant policies for new businesses [ibid: 157-162], This world-view underlies 
Weiss' conclusion that "nation-states will matter more rather than less", advancing 
rather than retarding the development of the world economy, due to “(1) state 
adaption rather than decline of functions, (2) strong states as "midwives" not victims of 
internationalisation, and (3) the emergence of "catalytic states" [like Japan] 
consolidating national and regional networks of trade and investment" [ibid: 196-7].
Importantly, however, all these studies are based primarily on research dating 
back to the mid-1990s. Subsequently, Japan's full-blown banking crisis in 1997 has 
been followed by accelerating deregulation and restructuring in financial markets, 
calling into question the "Japanese model", while the Asian financial crisis caused a 
reappraisal of market-driven methods of capitalist organisation. Weiss [1998:155] had 
observed that “a resurgent Japan is not an unlikely outcome of the quiet restructuring 
and institutional consolidation of the early- to mid-1990s", but so far there has been 
little evidence of this. Instead, "regulatory forbearance" (the polite term used by 
Kanaya & Woo [2000: 4]) has characterised Japan's banking crisis, contributing to an 
enormous huge fiscal cost (12 percent of GDP has already been allocated to dealing 
with the crisis), as well as probably being largely responsible for the stagnation of the 
Japanese real economy all through the 1990s. The stream of bad economic news 
from Tokyo, described in the opening quote [Murphy 2000] and showing few signs of 
abating,2 further undermines the view of contemporary Japan as a rather exemplary
For a sample over the New Year from the Mainichi Daily News, see eg "Sogo Shuts Down 8 




























































































"strong state” with extensive “transformative capacity".
In more recent writing stemming from a conference held at the European 
University Institute in October 1998, Weiss [2000: 42-49] still maintains that: (1) Japan 
had experienced some growth during Japan's so-called "lost decade"; (2) the Asian 
crisis may have undermined an incipient recovery; (3) the policy response of Japan's 
policy-makers, waiting for asset values to increase, may therefore have been rational 
and certainly appears no better or worse than responses for instance to the US 
savings and loan debacle a decade ago; (4) Japan still retains transformative capacity 
in the form of links among business and key state actors, including the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (MITI, as it was known) which has developed new industrial policy 
frameworks every decade (recently focusing on information and telecommunications 
infrastructure); and (5) deregulation was initiated by the Ministry of Finance to 
encourage Japan's financial sector also to “catch up".3 However, most commentators 
stress instead the poorly thought out nature of financial markets deregulation 
beginning before Japan's big bang, the large scope of its bad loans problem, the likely 
massive contraction in the size of Japan's banking sector as even more firms move to 
capital markets financing [Hoshi & Kashyap 1999]; or the relatively obvious likelihood 
of the present banking crisis, yet Japanese policy-makers' comparatively slow 
response [Hutchison and McDill 1999].4 Nonetheless, Weiss [2000: 48-49] concludes 
that:
The Japanese model has been sorely tested by recession, low growth and the bank crisis. But 
in the long run, it may be misguided to haii every change as another nail in the coffin of 
Japanese capitalism. Indeed, far from Americanizing Japanese capitalism, financial reforms 
may end up reinvigorating it via creative adaptations of existing institutions.
Certainly, we must go beyond breathless reports of radical change emerging from 
some of the financial press over recent years [Dore 1999 = 2000; see also Rhodes & 
Higgott 2000], The bewildering variety of conclusions reached by other commentators 
within Japan and abroad, especially in the US [Reich 2000], must also be scrutinised. 
Key parameters should be identified and quantified to determine whether the 
undoubted transformations in contemporary Japan imply a significant and rapid 
convergence on Anglo-American forms of capitalist organisation. Corporate 
governance in Japan can offer a central focus in this exercise, because it can be
"Jobless Rate Hits 4.8%" (27 December 2000)
<http://www.mainichi.co.jp/english/news/archive/200012/27/news01 ,html>; "Kumagai Gumi Gets 430 
Billion Yen Debt Waiver" (29 December 2000)
<http://www.mainichi.co.jp/english/news/archive/200012/29/news01.html>; "Chiyoda Life Made Shady 
500 Million Yen Loan" (10 January 2001)
<http://www.mainichi.co.jp/english/news/archive/200101/10/news01 ,html>.
Since a reorganization of central government in effect since 6 January, MITI has become the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). For a list of its initiatives in relation to e-commerce, see 
<httD://www.meti.ao.ip/english/special/E-Commerce/index.html>.
4 As one Japanese financial newspaper put it recently: "The nearly unanimous view among
experts is that Japan will have to undergo radical surgery to overcome its current crisis, which is not 
limited to the field of finance, and should be prepared to shed considerable blood" ("International 
Financial Community Gives Japan a Thumbs Down [Kokusai kin'yukai mo mihanasu Nippon no kikij" 
Toyo Keizai, 20 January 2001 <http://www.japanecho.co.jP/jeu/arti.html#t10>). One should also not 
forget Japan's "mini-crisis" with bad housing loans, prior to its full-blown banking crisis in 1997, another 
large financial debacle which was also characterised by moral hazard, regulatory failure, and sharp 




























































































broadly defined to cover most aspects potentially relevant to this determination in a 
coherent fashion, incorporating readily available recent data. Just as existing 
institutions may require what Weiss terms "creative adaptations”, however, so does 
the construction and application of theory in relation to Japan.
This paper therefore begins by arguing that problems of operating corporate 
bodies can be usefully conceptualised in terms of express or implied “agency” 
contracts among various stakeholders, especially managers and owner/shareholders, 
but also creditors, employees, suppliers or contractual partners outside the firm or 
other owners, and even local residents or government authorities (a type of “social 
contract).5 This view does not necessarily entail, as proponents of neo-classical “law 
and economics” tend to believe [eg Easterbrook & Fischel 1991], that all such 
contracts should be freed of any mandatory elements. But the approach is useful 
because it focuses on common problems underlying all these stakeholder 
relationship. The main problem is incomplete information. If all shared full information, 
for instance, shareholders or creditors would not have to worry about managers 
wasting their money. Yet in the real world, incomplete information gives rise to the 
dual problems of “adverse selection” (“hidden information”, resulting eg in creditors 
accepting to lend money to what turn out to be generally high-risk firms) and “moral 
hazard” (“hidden action”, eg managers investing loaned funds into excessively high 
risk projects). These difficulties are compounded by others: the inability to write 
contracts for the stakeholder relationships which expressly provide for all possible 
contingencies, because of the limits we face in foreseeing future scenarios [Hoshi 
1998: 849-850], and the inability to perfectly enforce those contracts.6 These 
definitions of "adverse selection” and "moral hazard" applied by Hoshi to analyse 
corporate governance may not accord precisely with their usage initially in the context 
of insurance, but they do highlight underlying problems of opportunism and bounded 
rationality [Williamson 1996].7 They can be usefully developed to uncover and
Cf also Kester 1991; Ballon & Honda 2000. However, Tsuru [1999: 3] cautions lor instance 
that such a broad definition of corporate governance may risk analytic looseness [see also Cioffi 2000]. 
Readers of this paper should judge that for themselves.
b Enforcement problems have often been highlighted in Japan. Indeed, Milhaupt & West [2000]
find strong statistical correlations between areas where problems exist and activities of criminal 
organizations.
As Gary Hawke has written (personal communication, 10 April 2000):
"... the terms [adverse selection and moral hazard] originated in the insurance world. The former was 
essentially that insurance pooling was based on random incidence of risks, whereas those most subject 
to risk were more likely to insure than those where the risk was relatively light. So the insurance company 
would get its sums wrong. "Moral hazard" related to behaviour after insuring. The client now faced less 
cost if the risk should crystallize and so needed to take less care. Again the insurance company would 
get its sums wrong because it underestimated the cost of risks which crystallised. But the terminology 
then got generalised loosely. In particular, it got taken into principal-agent analysis on the basis that 
principals and agents enter into an agreement but each has a temptation to cheat - the principals shift 
risk to agents if possible so that an agent discovers that the task is more difficult or less rewarding than 
was expected - adverse selection - and agents pursue their own interests rather than those of principals - 
trade for themselves as well as their principals and allocate the profitable ventures to themselves rather 
than to their principals - moral hazard. What is important is "opportunistic behaviour" and there is an 
arbitrary element in the choice of viewpoint that will give a resemblance to a particular form of 
opportunistic behaviour - moral hazard, adverse selection, and a range of other terms that are useful for 
teaching purposes but ultimately are unimportant labels. ...
The term "opportunistic" immediately directs attention to information. In the insurance world, 




























































































structure empirical data concerning relations involving managers and shareholders 
(Part II below), creditors of the firm (Part III), and employees (Part IV). The overall 
picture is one of significant rapprochement of manager and shareholder interests; 
severe challenges to post-War bank-financing measures; but less obvious or perhaps 
only longer term pressures reshaping employment relations.
Yet raw opportunism may not be the only force at work (Part V). Seemingly 
robust patterns of cooperative relations have developed among firms in some 
industrial sectors, especially in the automobile industry, notably in post-War Japan but 
later finding root in the US. The attraction of this model, entrenching trust through 
quite radical information gathering and sharing among expanding groups of 
participants, may encourage the emergence of novel forms of corporate governance 
[Helper, MacDuffie & Sabel 2000], even if the overall trend in Japan nowadays is 
towards more arm's length relations. Arguably, a key determinant will be whether 
similar processes of “learning by monitoring" take root also at the level of the 
Japanese state, another key stakeholder in corporate organisations. Adding this 
contingency further clouds a final assessment of whether Japan will converge on neo­
liberal models. But such refinements add new perspectives on the ongoing debate on 
"varieties of capitalism". In particular, by uncovering possibly conflicting tendencies at 
different levels of socio-economic and political ordering, they take us beyond views of 
pervasive transformations and blanket convergence on the one hand, or little change 
and persistent differences on the other.
II. Shareholders as Primary Stakeholders /
The agency problem between shareholders and managers remains usually the most 
important aspect of corporate governance, at least for large publicly held companies.9 
To counter the informational advantage held by managers, basically two types of 
systems are available to shareholders. The first is “control oriented”. That is, the 
shareholders monitor management behaviour, often delegating this to a Board of 
Directors whom they elect; and they intervene if necessary, eg by a proxy vote fight to 
replace Directors and hence managers. However, the costs involved in this system 
usually make it more attractive to large shareholders with good management skills 
themselves. A second system available to shareholders, “arm’s length” control, is 
more passive; the shareholders do not actively intervene in management. However
a particular proposal relative to the average, and about how the behaviour of the client will respond to an 
insurance contract. ... As an economic historian, I usually start discussion in this area from nineteenth 
century British banking. Shareholders of banks could not free themselves from an additional reserve 
liability; on liquidation they were liable for an amount equal to their shareholding - they therefore had an 
incentive to keep an eye on managers - and furthermore, the liability was "joint and several" so that each 
shareholder had an incentive to keep an eye on the wealth of those admitted to the register since if any 
went bankrupt their liability passed to the rest of the shareholders. (As happened in several cases). 
Creditors of banks got some confidence from such provisions. Why did they give it up? (Not until the 
1950s in New Zealand but it was a dead letter before then.) The basic answer is the development of 
auditing and auditors' certificates. Creditors had an alternative agent and could concede greater flexibility 
to bank managers and relieve shareholders from acting as watchdogs on one another and let them focus 
on directors."
There are about 9,000 such companies in Japan [Kanda 1998 contains useful further 




























































































they take action when unsatisfied with managers, especially by selling shares, which 
may lower share prices and encourage eg hostile takeovers. Employee share 
ownership programmes (ESOPs) can also facilitate such indirect control, by turning 
employees into another type of stakeholder - shareholders. Another way to motivate 
managers to work for shareholders is to create common interests, eg through high- 
powered incentive methods such as very profit-sensitive bonuses or stock options 
[Hoshi 1998: 851-2],
For most of the post-War period in Japan, “arm’s length” control has been 
weak; but this has begun to change since the 1990s. On the one hand, stock option 
schemes were legalised in mid-1997. By January 1999, 165 companies (96 listed) had 
introduced them, including some of Japan's largest companies as well as new start­
ups (in internet or family-care business).11 In turn, this may begin to affect a 
longstanding reluctance to remunerate executives of Japanese corporations as highly 
as their counterparts overseas.12 Further, bonuses in Japan have been linked to 
profits generated -  in fact, more so (ironically) than dividends paid to shareholders -  
but not linked closely enough to generate in itself what Hoshi calls a "high powered" 
incentive-for managers to work in shareholders' interests. However, even the bigger 
firms nowadays, despite their tradition of “life-time employment” with promotion based 
primarily on seniority, are beginning to introduce performance related wage 
differentials (see Part IV below). These transformations in labour relations may also 
reactivate ESOPs as an incentive for good management. So far in Japan, although 
ESOPs have been adopted by a large majority of listed companies and collectively 
amount to significant percentage shareholdings, they have not encouraged more 
dividend payouts nor acted as a mechanism to independently control management 
[Hayakawa 1997: 243-4]. Instead, reliance has been placed on “career concerns" -- 
tying reputation to company performance [Tsuru 1999: 5], This is now undermined by 
economic stagnation.
On the other hand, other types of arm’s length control have long operated in 
Japan, albeit not always so obviously; and they too are becoming increasingly 
important. Commentators have long stressed the lack of hostile takeovers in post-War 
Japan, due in large part to the development of extensive cross-shareholdings among 
firms. The precise historical roots of this tendency remain unclear, although most 
accounts point to stock market weaknesses soon after World War II, when capital was 
needed by companies and the threat of takeovers was high. Ironically, cross­
shareholding also may have emerged because Japanese corporate law further 
extended substantive rights to shareholders, influenced by US law, yet many of those 
rights have remained mandatory [Shishido 2000: 211]. Japanese managers therefore 
may have encouraged the development of cross-shareholding as an alternative way 
to protect their interests [see also Takahashi 1997: 232]. Managers In the US and 
elsewhere have been able to invoke other techniques more recently, through tailoring 
their corporate constitutions etc (eg “poison pills” whereby a debenture etc must be 
issued if an investor purchases more than a set percentage of shares, or 
arrangements to limit to voting rights to a minority percentage even if the investor 
obtains more than that percentage of shares).
Whatever the historical origins of the comparative lack of hostile takeovers in 
post-War Japan, the normative force of this phenomenon has been shaken by recent
11 [Yasui 1999: 16]; “ Introduction of Stock Options in Major Firms" 39/9 Japan Labour Law 
Bulletin (2000) <http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vol39-09/03.htm>.




























































































developments. On 24 January 2000, Shoei Corporation was subjected to a hostile bid 
from a Japanese firm called M&A Consulting (MAC), led by a former senior official at 
MITI and financed by Orix Corporation, a large leasing and financial services provider 
[Milhaupt 2001: 21-23]. Although it only obtained 6.5 percent of the target, in which 
cross-shareholders controlled two-thirds of outstanding stocks, MAC went on to 
propose two shareholders' resolutions and secure proxy votes at Shoei Corporation's 
annual general meeting on 28 March, garnering 30 percent support.128
The emergence of such nonconformist "norm entrepreneurs” are partly a 
reflection of the changes in Japan over the 1990s. But they build on some less 
obvious arm's length control mechanisms which remained operative throughout the 
post-War period. So-called "friendly" takeovers or mergers often occurred in the 
context of poor performance, reflected in weak share prices. Importantly, from the 
perspective of shareholder/management agency theory, there is strong correlation 
between share price weakness and resignations of managers [Kaplan & Ramseyer 
1996; Tsuru 1999: 6], While managers are not replaced by those taking over firms in 
hostile bids, they retire “voluntarily". Shishido [2000: 216] provides one important 
causal explanation for this pattern: Japanese firms who perform badly on the 
sharemarket find it difficult to raise equity finance, and that makes it more difficult to 
obtain debt finance from banks. That pressure will be all the greater in recessionary 
times, as in Japan nowadays. Conversely, he notes some recent evidence that 
pressures from the Japanese share market already are forcing some firms to 
restructure their labor relations, and then signaling satisfaction with that management 
response in the form of higher share prices [idem, fn 112]. Overall, moreover, 
aggregate cross-shareholding in publically traded shares has declined since the stock 
market collapse and burst of Japan's "bubble" economy in the early 1990s [Takahashi 
1997: 233-4], Indeed the pace seems to be accelerating, cross-shareholding ratios of 
around 21 % from 1986 to 1995 (money base) declining to 16% in 1998 [Shishido 
2000: 226, Table 6]. More declines can be expected. Indeed, there were reports of 
Japanese corporations winding down cross-shareholdings vigorously in the first 
quarter of 2000 to improve their balance sheets before the end of the fiscal year, 
taking advantage of a brief revival of the Japanese stockmarket in 1999 [US Embassy 
Tokyo 2000],
What life has remained in the stockmarket over the 1990s has been due in 
large measure to investment from abroad.13 Particularly noticeable in recent years is 
more interest from foreign institutional investors, such as pension and investment 
funds, whose growing presence in Japan was noted already in the mid-1990s 
[Hayakawa 1997: 243]. Although nowadays driven in part by the much bigger boom in 
the US share market, another key development has been the deregulation of financial 
markets in Japan in recent years (Part III below). While these institutional investors 
may become less prominent in Japan if there is a major downturn in the US, they 
surely will remain a significant new feature of Japanese financial markets. As in other 
countries [see eg Coffee 1991, 1997], they should continue to inject more arm’s 
length control into the corporate governance system in Japan [Fukao 1999],
One related indication of this is more attention among managers towards 
efficient use of capital and return on equity. Many companies have provided for share
See <http://www.maconsulting.co.jp/achiev.htm> (also reporting other recent aggressive 
activities of this entrepreneur).
By the end of the decade, foreigners held about 10 percent of listed shares, and 12 percent of 




























































































buybacks following amendments to the Commercial Code in 1995 and especially 
1998, although fewer have actually carried out repurchases [Yasui 1999: 16] and 
Dore [1999 = 2000] questions whether greater attention from managers to these 
indices reflects more promotion of shareholder interests as opposed to faddism etc. 
Another aspect is relaxations in December 1997 on the creation of holding 
companies, seen by Shishido [2000: 223] as a possible answer to a set of key 
problems in Japanese conglomerates so far: accountability and determination of 
profit centers [Yasui 1999: 18; see also Thorson & Siegfranz 1999]. These may also 
be addressed by recent amendments to facilitate corporate reorganisations [see 
generally Nakahigashi 2000],
Significant changes in accounting rules for listed companies underpin such 
developments, expanding possibilities for “arms’ length’’ control.14 These have been 
prompted in part by massive discrepancies in reported financial statements for failed 
financial institutions, as well as mistrust of internal auditing procedures after a series 
of well publicised problems involving corporate racketeers [Yasui 1999: 13]. 
Consolidated disclosure of contingent liabilities, such as guarantees (common in 
Japanese corporate finance), took effect in April 1998. The following year, the scope 
of subsidiaries and affiliates which had to be included in accounts was expanded. 
From April 2000, all marketable financial assets held for trading purposes had to 
recorded at market price rather than book value, and market value accounting also for 
cross-shareholdings and long-term securities holdings is required from April 2001. 
From April 2000 or (optionally) 2001, moreover, listed companies must disclose 
unfunded pension liabilities by valuing pension assets and liabilities at market price. 
This already has highlighted further difficulties in some of Japan’s largest firms,15 and 
all these changes make evaluation of shareholdings more transparent and objective.
In parallel, potentially important developments have started to transform 
“control-oriented” shareholder mechanisms. The “main bank” system has been central 
in this regard for most the post-War period. It involved a bank -  usually with the 
largest shareholding, albeit limited under the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) to five percent 
or less -  sending its own managers to direct operations of debtor companies 
performing too badly. The system is coming under pressure also due to the recession, 
particularly as it has affected Japanese financial institutions, combined with 
deregulation of the financial sector (Part III below).
By contrast, smaller or less powerful shareholders in Japanese companies 
have faced a major obstacle in exercising more direct control over managers: the 
emasculation of the Board of Directors, due to the tradition of appointing Directors 
from among managers, usually resulting in very large Boards.16 This too has been 
related to patterns of life-long employment in (at least top-tier) Japanese companies.
See [US Embassy Tokyo 2000]; “Dawning of the New Accounting Age” Japan Economic 
Update (April 22/25, 2000) <http://www.japanecho.co.jp/jeu/arch/000422.html#t3>; and especially the 
regularly updated website of the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
<http://www.jicpa.or.jp/n_eng/e-newsflash.html>. On the centrality of the relationship between accounting 
rules and corporate governance, cf generally [Grossfeld 2000], See also the pressures towards 
convergence created by securities law reforms world-wide, arguably more significant than changes to 
corporate law rules; [Coffee 1999],
See eg “What Will Ghosn Do About Nissan's 400 Billion Yen Pension Debt?” Japan Economic 
Update [April 22/25, 2000] <http://www.japanecho.co.jp/jeu/arch/000422.html#t4>.
In July 1998, the average number of directors in listed companies was twenty, and 49 had 




























































































Combined with keiretsu and other links within groups of companies,163 this tradition 
also has tended to make the “statutory auditor” scheme largely ineffective in 
monitoring management [Yasui 1999: 5],
This cosy system is now challenged by more appointment of outside 
directors. Boards are also being downsized to promote more effective decision­
making. An early example was Sony, always an innovator, and now with particularly 
high foreign ownership [but see Dore 1999 = 2000]. But of the two thirds of listed 
companies which responded to a September 1998 survey, 30 percent had appointed 
outside directors and reduced the size of the Board [Tokyo Stock Exchange 2000: 3]; 
and by May 1999, about half of the 17 major banks had introduced executive officers 
(instead of directors) and downsized their Boards [Yasui 1999: 20], Lateral pressure 
came from the Corporate Governance Forum, established in 1994 by a former 
president of the Industrial Bank of Japan (now merged into the Mizuho group) and 
now co-led by Orix Corporation chairman Yoshihiko Miyauchi. The Forum published 
Principles of Corporate Governance in 1997 [Gibson 1998: 14], and calls for corporate 
governance rules reforms similar to those espoused by the OECD and the California 
Public Employees Retirement System (CALPers). Also important are direct pressures 
from institutional investors, especially from abroad like CALPers. Further, as foreign 
direct investment in Japanese companies grows [Bonacker 1999], outside directors 
should become more common. To be sure, so far the most salient examples of 
outside appointments to the boards of Japanese companies have been from large 
foreign investors in very weak companies.17 These have mainly been as managing 
directors, rather than non-executive directors theoretically better able to monitor for 
shareholder interests. Yet, as outsiders, even this tendency disrupts the traditional 
Board structure in Japanese corporate governance. Even some insiders are becoming 
less predictable, with a number of prominent presidents having reached their position 
through career paths outside the mainstream within their companies, including lengthy 
periods abroad. They have taken initiatives in increasing truly independent statutory 
auditors, promoting disclosure, and so on [Tsuru 1999: 11]. All these developments 
help explain why a Study Group sponsored by MITI, regulating and supporting most 
areas of industry in Japan, has proposed significant reforms to Japanese corporate 
law by 2002, including more outside directors and other measures to separate 
management from monitors of corporate activities.173
16a In a typically provocative paper, [Miwa & Ramseyer 2001] contend that main-bank or
horizontal keiretsu are no more than a "fable" concocted first by Marxist economists in Japan in the 
1960s. While presenting some econometric data suggesting that financial links cementing firms in such 
corporate groupings are not significant, however, they do not test for personnel exchanges among group 
firms.
Such as Renault in Nissan (see eg "Nissan's Restructuring Plan and the Union's Response", 
39/1 Japan Labor Bulletin (2000) <http://www.iil.ao.ip/bulletin/vear/2000/vol39-01/03.htm#2>: “Putting 
Nissan Back on Track” Japan Echo [April 2000]: 36
<http://www.japanecho.co.jp/docs/html/270211.html>); DaimlerChrysler in scandal-stricken Mitsubishi 
Motors (see eg [Nottage 2000c]). See also “Merging Japan” OECD Observer [24 February 2000] 
<http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/198>.
One of the largest pension funds in the world, CALPers increased significantly its investments 
outside the US in the mid-1990s, calling for improvements in corporate governance in countries like 
Japan in which it increased exposure: <http://www.calpers.ca.gov/about/factglan/corpgov/corpgov.htm>. 
It has since teamed up with the large UK fund, Hermes (<http://www.hermes.co.uk>), to advance such 
causes. However, appointing outside directors is not only a foreign concern: "According to a survey by 




























































































Involving outside directors, and heightened attention generally to shareholder 
rights in the 1990s [Kitagawa and Nottage 1998], are trends related to a strengthening 
of the ability of all shareholders - including minority shareholders - to enforce their 
rights. Especially in shareholder derivative litigation, the key seems to have been a 
legislative amendment in 1993 which set filing fees at a uniform 8,200 Yen (less than 
US$100). There were only 74 derivative action cases pending in Japanese district 
courts in 1993; but this jumped to 133 in 1994 and to 158 in 1995 [Shishido 2000: 197 
fn 35], In 1997, there were 219 derivative suits pending before District and High 
Courts [Tsuru 1999: 10], and 286 pending by the end of 1999 [West 2000a: 9, Table 
1]. By 1998, half of listed companies had taken out insurance covering directors 
against certain claims [Dore 1999: 22 = 2000]. This procedural change thus has 
significantly reinforced the comparatively strong substantive rights of shareholders 
under Japanese law [see also Kawashima and Sakurai 1997], Further, in late 2000 
the Osaka District Court awarded a record 83 billion yen in damages against 11 
former directors of Daiwa Bank, in a shareholders’ suit based on poor supervision 
resulting in illegal bond trading by the bank’s New York office [Milhaupt 2001: 24]. The 
collapse of the Sogo department store chain resulted in another massive claim 
against its founding president in 2001; and on 12 March, a lawyer belonging to the 
"Kabunushi Ombudsman" watchdog group filed suit against 11 former and current 
directors of Mitsubishi Motors Corporation for 1.17 billion yen, demanding they take 
responsibility for 1.5 billion yen in lost vehicle sales resulting from concealing defect 
claims. These events have prompted business interests to call for amendments to the 
Commercial Code to restrict liability exposure of managers, but strong opposition is 
being voiced.18 By expanding the capacity of all shareholders to directly or indirectly 
control managers, the burgeoning shareholder derivative litigation makes it more 
difficult for key shareholders (such as main banks) to act in their own interests (or of 
blocks such as creditors) to the detriment of shareholders overall [Yasui 1999: 10]. 
Thus, ''control-oriented" supervision of managers by main banks is further displaced 
by actual or potential supervision through shareholders more generally.
III. Creditors, Recession, and Financial Market Deregulation
A distinctive feature of post-War corporate governance in Japan has been the greater 
importance of creditors as stakeholders, due to comparatively more use of bank rather 
than equity finance. Yet this characteristic has been fading over the last two decades, 
as companies accumulated retained earnings and gradual financial markets 
deregulation permitted them to more readily raise funds through bond issues and so 
on. Already in mid-1997, before the banking crisis, a survey of managers found that 
60 percent expected the role of “main banks" to decline [Yasui 1999: 12]. The relative
suggested that outside directors would stimulate the debate, add new perspectives, and strengthen 
monitoring" (Nicholas Benes, "Finally, Corporate Japan Begins to Shift into Reform Gear", Asian Wall 
Street Journal, 8-14 January 2001, 16). More generally, Japanese institutional investors recently "were 
urged by the Employees' Pension Fund Association, the effective leader of [Japan's] corporate pension 
sector, to exercise [voting rights at shareholders' meetings] to the advantage of pensioners". US 
consulting firm Institutional Shareholders Services entered the Japanese market in April 2001 aiming to 
show them how to best do so: "Japanese Shareholders to be Schooled in How to Exercise Voting 
Rights", Nikkei Weekly, 12 February 2001, 12.
“Conditions Required for Limits on Corporate Lawsuit Redress” , Asahi Shimbun, 29 
December 2000; "Shareholder Group Sues MMC Over Cover-Up", Mainichi Daily News, 13 March 2001. 




























































































importance of capital markets in corporate finance will undoubtedly expand in 
importance in the wake of ongoing economic stagnation and the current severe credit 
crunch, combined with globalisation and broader financial market deregulation. The 
latter program was initiated at the end of 1996, but mostly from 1998, due to poor 
return on capital by Japanese financial institutions throughout the post-War period, 
and especially a rapid loss of global competitiveness in the 1990s. This "Big Bang" (or 
"Long Bang"!) is now almost complete, and the legislative and structural reforms are 
very wide-ranging.19
As mentioned above (Part II), like other stakeholder relationships, the 
relationship between creditors and managers gives rise to problems of adverse 
selection (leading to credit going too readily to risky firms) and of moral hazard 
(monitoring problems allowing poor projects by management). Blame for the abrupt 
decline in the Japanese financial sector over the 1990s lies in part with the Japanese 
government, particularly the Ministry of Finance (the Bank of Japan having become a 
more independent policy maker only recently). Yet Japanese financial institutions 
were also responsible for their own plight, having embarked on a huge spending 
spree in the late 1980s, which has led to the massive bad debts reported in recent 
years [Reszat 1999]. Generally, this disaster stems from distortions in evaluating and 
pricing risk [see Keidanren/21CPPI 1999], Specifically, it relates to problems in 
corporate governance which encouraged financial institutions in Japan to lend (and 
invest) in risky firms, and then not adequately monitor managers in those firms [see 
generally Dickie 1999: 10; Kanaya & Woo 2000].
One solution for these tensions between creditors and managers is to give 
creditors shares in the companies they lend to. This helps to the extent that 
shareholders generally can overcome agency problems vis a vis managers (on which, 
therefore, see again Part II). In addition, creditors can attempt to control managers in 
two main ways. One, again, is more "arm's length" control. The creditor still delegates 
much control to managers, but may step in to force bankruptcy, thus creating an 
incentive for managers to pursue creditors' interests [Hoshi 1998: 853]. However, 
forcing bankruptcy must be a credible option, and Japanese bankruptcy law has had 
various problems which only started to be addressed seriously towards the end of the 
1990s [for an overview , see Anderson 2000: 700-24]. One result has been enactment 
of a more functional corporate reorganisation regime in 1999, generating 392 
proceedings within the first six months of coming into force on 1 April 2001 [Kaiser 
2001].
Alternatively, or in addition, creditors can adopt more control-oriented 
strategies. They can monitor more directly the behaviour of managers, and intervene 
if necessary in their appointment or replacement. One way in which Japanese banks 
have been able to directly monitor their lenders' managers, at least within Japan, has 
been by providing a range of services (eg general business advice or match-making) 
rather than just loans. Yet that was difficult in overseas lending; and encountered 
difficulties domestically as Japanese companies themselves became more 
sophisticated, and competition intensified as a result of accelerating financial markets 
deregulation. The latter, combined with the recessionary environment facing 
Japanese financial institutions in particular, also makes it more difficult to retain the 
long-term relationship required to be a firm's “main bank" [Yasui 1999: 12-13]. Key
A comprehensive recent time-line is available from the Ministry of Finance's website, at 
<http://www.mof.go.jp/english/big-bang/ebb33.pdf>; see also [Sibbitt 1998, Kanda 1999]. See generally 




























































































aspects were a primary lender which also held shares over lengthy periods, and 
intervened especially in times of debtor's financial distress by seconding bank 
managers. As banks become strapped for funds, however, they may call in their loans 
or simply refuse to lend more; an increase in lender liability claims by debtors was 
noted already in the mid-1990s [Milhaupt 1996: 49-55]. More recently, other cases 
have been reported in which main banks did not save companies by providing loans, 
while in other instances they did not bear a disproportionate burden of losses 
following liquidation. A related phenomenon is a belated "flight to quality” in lending, 
perversely exacerbating the present credit crunch. Finally, there is evidence of banks 
selling off their shareholdings, reportedly after client firms offloaded their stocks in 
banks, and in the shadow of dangerous declines in the ratio of market over book 
value (4:1 in 1986, but only just over 1:1 in 1998 [Fukao 1999: 6-8]). Unwinding 
shareholdings prevents financial institutions remaining or developing into a main bank, 
better able to monitor debtor firms, and creates less incentive to send their own 
managers to debtor firms if in distress (especially as even the big banks have enough 
problems of their own nowadays!). Reputation as a main bank can unravel quickly, 
and is difficult to regain [Tsuru 1999: 8],
Such breakdowns become even more likely as more and more foreign 
financial institutions have taken advantage of deregulation to enter the Japanese 
market since the late 1990s [Sibbett 1998]. These outsiders are particularly likely not 
to take over, and certainly not take on, even small shareholdings in debtor firms in 
such a changing environment. Even if they do, they may refuse to "take turns”, 
accepting the delegation of other creditor/shareholders to send valuable management 
resources to help keep debtor firms alive. Their inclination, no doubt often in their 
short-term interest, may be to enforce their strict legal rights, calling in their security or 
forcing bankruptcy,. After all, lending institutions (and associations) in Japan have long 
made sure that their strict rights are well protected by contract and commercial 
practice at the time of lending [Kanda 1998: 940; cf Milhaupt & West 2000].
Three other factors now undermine the main bank system [Milhaupt 2001: 
19-21]. The first arises from the nationalisation and re-privatisation of the failed Long- 
Term Credit Bank. The government sold it to a group of foreign investors including 
Citigroup, giving a "put option" to return any assets (loans) that decline from book 
value (as of 1 March 2000) by 20 percent or more within three years. But this is lost if 
the bank accepts a borrower's request for loan forgiveness. In mid-2000, the re­
privatised bank refused to forgive debts owed by Sogo Department Store, forcing it 
into bankruptcy, going against what has been expected a main bank. More generally, 
bank failures like this one undercut an implicit guarantee against this given by the 
Japanese government [Milhaupt and Miller 1997], in exchange for strong institutions 
supporting weak ones through the main bank system. Finally, the Asian financial crisis 
and Japan's long recession are perceived to have caused a significant shift in beliefs 
about the benefits of bank-oriented corporate finance and governance.
Theoretically, there is some possibility of Japanese financial institutions 
instead starting to accumulate larger shareholdings in debtor firms, hence positioning 
themselves for more control-oriented monitoring of debtor firms. This could follow from 
an amendment to Article 11 of the AML, as clarified by Japan Fair Trade Commission 
Guidelines, whereby a financial institution can hold more than 5 percent of shares 
issued by a company, if the latter's business was subordinated to the former's, "at 
least 50 percent, in principle". Previously, this was only allowed if "at least 90%, in 
principle” [Sibbitt 1998]. As more and more firms are permitted to add financial 




























































































shareholdings in them. Yet it still does not remain open for investments in companies 
whose main business is not related to financial services, even in the new broad 
sense. In addition, as the economic recession and problems in the financial sector 
persist, it seems unlikely that financial institutions in Japan will want to try to invest 
broadly like this. Rather, we can expect more sell-offs in the small shareholdings held 
so far, and consequent ongoing decline in the main bank system as a key corporate 
governance mechanism in Japan, although it may remain important for smaller firms 
[cf Koen 2000].
Domestic institutional investors, whose buffers of unrealised gains in land 
and shares have also been sharply eroded, will find it difficult take up this slack, at 
least on the basis so far of them implicitly assuming disproportionate risks through 
such buffers. This reinforces pressures to (1) allow defined contribution pension plans 
improve disclosure and accountancy rules to attract foreign investment,20 (2) restore 
faith in investment trust management to encourage more individual investment on the 
Japanese sharemarket, (3) improve disclosure and accountancy rules to promote 
further investment from abroad, and (4) further encourage share buybacks [Fukao 
1999],
IV. Employees and the Vicissitudes of the Labour Market
Another often cited aspect of Japanese corporate governance, especially through to 
the 1980s, is the strong influence of employees [eg Miwa 1998, Yamakawa 1999a]. 
The conventional wisdom has been that Japanese corporate governance was 
profoundly influenced by the orientation of companies first towards "people” (ie 
employees), then "products" (ie technically excellent goods), then "profits" (for 
shareholders). This is contrasted with the German model (fixated first on products, 
then people, and then profits), and especially the Anglo-American model (first profits, 
then products, people last!).2' The importance of employees in Japanese companies, 
at least “regular” employees in larger ones, has admittedly been strong. Yet this factor 
can also be analysed in terms of agency problems, and how their stakeholding in 
companies relates to that of other stakeholders. That analysis, together with observed 
tendencies in the labour market and important legislative amendments, points to 
further growing pressures on Japanese corporate governance.22
J Broader based reform of the state pension scheme also seems important, since this
underscored the shift in corporate governance in the US and had dampened that in Germany [O'Sullivan 
2000],
[Lehmann 1997: 96-99]. This picture accords with some survey evidence included in a book 
published in 1997 by a Kyoto University economics professor: [Tachibanaki 1999: 51].
" Somewhat similarly, Fukao [1999: 21, 23] predicts the following realignment in various
stakeholders' proportional "claims" to company assets, namely from:
(1) Creditors > Core Employees > Top Executives > Shareholders (but only realized profits that 
could be used as dividends) > Other Employees
to:
(2) Creditors > Smaller Group of Core Employees > Top Executives > Shareholders (all profits, 
including unrealized profits) > Other Employees
By contrast, Haley [2001, before fn 19] insists that Japan will not change its fundamentally 
“communitarian" orientation without change in what sees as the most distinctive and central institutional 
feature of post-War Japan: "entry level hiring coupled with a central personnel office staffed by senior 
career managers] with full responsibility for the recruitment, training, assignment and promotion of 




























































































Usually, discussions of relations between employees and managers centre 
on the latter as “principals", attempting to hire the former as “agents" despite the 
possibility of adverse selection, and to monitor their delegated activities despite moral 
hazard ("shirking", due again to imperfect information in the relationship). This can 
simply be reversed to analyse implications for corporate governance. The problem 
then becomes how employees, as principals, constrain managers, agents who may 
prefer to fritter away company funds on themselves. Again, one solution is to give 
employees shares in the company (through ESOPs and the like), but this will only 
constrain managers to the extent that agency problems between shareholders and 
managers is resolved generally (Part II above). Otherwise, the only realistic alternative 
is more control-oriented measures. One example is the two-tier board structure for 
Germany stock companies, in which a supervisory board is partly elected by 
employees, and then appoints management board members [Roe 1999]. Japanese 
corporate law provides no such formal mechanism for employee supervision of 
managers. Yet control arises in practice especially because most managers in large 
Japanese companies have been appointed from among existing employees, in a 
system of life-long employment and promotion based primarily on seniority. 
Correspondingly, the external labour market has not grown much in recent decades.
Again, the origins of such institutions are unclear. Like several supposedly 
distinctive features of Japanese law (such as limited numbers of practising lawyers 
[Haley 1978]), the practice of lifelong employment seems to have taken root only quite 
recently [cf also Foote 1996; Jackson 1999 = forthcoming], Gilson and Roe [1999: 
520] observe that "from World War I through to the end of World War II, worker 
mobility in external labor markets eroded labor stability when labor was tight, and 
employees' willingness to fire even senior workers eroded labor stability when labor 
markets were not tight. Employees tried but failed to build wage and seniority 
structures to induce workers to stay during labor shortages. Government intervention 
reduced but failed to stop turnover". They argue that lifetime employment practices 
arose in the even more unlikely economic environment shortly after World War II, 
characterised by extreme labour surplus, because of exceptional political events. 
Rapid unionisation and radical worker activism (strikes and plant takeovers) prompted 
conservative reactions and a "deal" establishing a privileged segment of labour 
(mainly surviving employees) accorded lifetime employment. Thereafter, "Japan's 
economic problem was to craft associated institutions that could function effectively 
given the politically imposed lifetime employment", including restrictions in external 
labour markets [ibid: 524]. Yet nowadays Japan faces a very different political as well 
as economic environment, with record unemployment (and further "under­
employment"), and institutional changes opening up the possibility again of increasing 
worker mobility through external labour markets. Gilson and Roe [ibid: 540] also 
identify several significant “stress points" in the post-War Japanese system. For 
instance, it does not cope well during times of dramatic technological change,23 and 
"competition" among lifelong employees for promotion in an internal labour market will
paper, this pattern has been pervasive among large companies in the US (TWA, GM, etc). Even more 
compellingly, Masako Kamiya responded that the pattern seen as central by Haley is irrelevant to the 
large majority of Japanese firms and employees (many still with only high school education). More 
generally, Haley did not provide any empirical data on labour market changes or perceptions, and 
legislative changes, as presented in Part IV of this paper.
Including significant developments in IT in the late 1990s, after an admittedly slow start at 




























































































not work effectively when firms no longer are growing.
Rather similarly, Shishido [2000: 222] points out that labour turnover rates in 
the 1920s and 1930s were almost the same as that in the US, but the latter jumped in 
the 1940s and has remained much higher ever since. He argues that the 
transformation in the US was linked to the Great Depression, and that if the Japanese 
recession continues there will be an irreversible decline in lifetime employment as a 
key aspect sustaining the post-War corporate governance system in Japan. More 
generally, ongoing recession creates a zero-sum situation and heightens conflicts 
between employees and other stakeholders, notably shareholders. The latter will no 
longer tolerate employees being treated as de facto residual claimants, for instance 
earning wage hikes or salary bonuses while dividends remain constant or decline.24 
Shishido [ibid: 217] also identifies a parallel strengthening of the external labour 
market and the corporate control (share-)market.
Labour law scholars such as Yamakawa [1999a], perhaps due to reliance on 
more historical data, are more impressed by the enduring quality of the post-War 
model; but note a number of major challenges to this model. One is precisely the 
broader political economy environment. The recession plus deregulation create more 
variability in corporate profitability, a key factor as the credit crunch still facing 
Japanese financial institutions further encourages companies turn to stock and bond 
markets - often global, and more demanding of good corporate/managerial 
performance. In addition, the service sector continues to grow in importance, bringing 
the need for (and the possibility of) more flexible working hours [cf also Hanami 
1999a]. Both factors are related to changing demographics in the labour force 
generally, characterised by more elderly people, women, and part-time workers 
[Kezuka 2000]. This also affects the resilience of lifelong employment as a core 
concept in the Japanese corporate world. Yamakawa [1999b: 3] still concludes that it 
will remain, albeit with some modifications. In particular, he relies on a 1999 survey of 
the Japanese Institute of Labour in which 33.8 percent of respondents (690 
companies out of 2370 employing 1000 or more people) declared they intended to 
maintain the life-long employment system; 44.8 percent said it had to be partially 
modified; and 17.1 percent said it needed radical reexamination.
Suzuki [1999:10] suggests that "some persistence of the long-term 
employment practice" is indicated by a survey conducted in February 1999 by the 
Research Institute for the Advancement of Living Standards, a think tank funded by 
the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo). Senior managers from 731 out of 
1307 companies listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange mostly 
thought that it was "not probable" over the next five years that "employees with short 
length of service become ordinary even in the core members" (59.4%); only 11.56
Hitherto uniform and almost ritualized, collective wage bargaining in spring 2000 was 
distinguished by no basic wage increases, even in the largest firms. Further, in the important steel 
industry, the five major companies broke with tradition in giving two differing sets of small increases. 
Finally: “A Ministry of Labour survey suggests it is likely that the average pay hike in percentage terms 
will be around two percent, lower than the previous record low of 2.21 percent last year. Many labor 
leaders believe that the outcome of this year's wage talks reflects an on-going shift in the priority which 
management is now giving to shareholders at the expense of employees, a situation they view with 
alarm. See "2000 Spring Offensive: Signs of Change” 39/6 Japan Labor Law Bulletin (2000) 
<http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vol39-06/02.htm>. Possibly related, or of indirect potential 
importance, is the merger of new industry-based unions and the creation of some totally new ones: 
“Reshuffling of Industry-based Unions” 39/10 Japan Labor Law Bulletin (2000)




























































































thought it “probable", with 27.1% unable to guess and 0.8% reporting it "happening 
now". However, a similar majority (56.6%) thought it probable that promotion would 
come to be based on performance rather than seniority, a trend also acknowledged 
by Yamakawa. The Rengo survey also shows that most managers tended to expect 
significant changes in manager attention to Return on Shareholder Equity and 
management monitoring mechanisms.
Further pressures on the lifelong employment system is provided by a survey 
by a Labour Ministry working group in January 2000. It found that only 9.5% of 591 
respondent firms continued attaching importance to life long employment, while 38.3% 
did not and 51% did so only on a limited basis.25 However, a problem with all these 
surveys is that they question incumbents within firms. To get a better picture of the 
future of this central aspect of Japan's employment and corporate governance 
systems, more research should be conducted into what young people want 
nowadays. Certainly it seems that they are disillusioned with the fact that present 
employment patterns in Japan are strongly biased towards the incumbent, older 
generation, especially those in lifelong employment [Genda 1999],
Finally, Yamakawa [1999b: 1-2, 5-14] surveys major changes recently made 
to an array of labour legislation. These should cement in place or encourage broader 
transformations in the labour market in Japan.27 They include, for instance [Nottage 
2000d, paras JPN T)60-003 ffj:
•  1998 amendments to the Labour Standards Law: allowing longer-term labour 
contracts; requiring written clarifications of work conditions upon hire, and 
reasons for termination (a growing source of tension);28 and divorcing overtime 
payments from hours worked (indicating more stress on quality of work);
•  1997 amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity Law [cf Hanami 1999b]: 
now prohibiting discrimination in recruitment, assignment, promotion, as well as in 
dismissal and retirement; compelling employers to mediation if requested by
"More Japanese Firms See Life Employment Unnecessary: Survey" Japan Economic 
Newswire, 14 November 2000.
This assumes of course that formal legal rules do matter in Japan. In her Ph.D thesis 
submitted to the European University Institute, Konsta [2000: 2424] concludes to the contrary, focusing 
on labour law generally and working time regulation in particular. This runs contrary directly to the 
analyses of Foote in this and other areas of labour law [1996, 1997], and for instance in traffic accident 
dispute resolution [Foote 1995]. It is also contrary to sociologically informed studies of product liability 
[Nottage & Wada 1998, Nottage 2000a, Nottage 2000c], contracting [Nottage 1997a, 1997b, 1998b], and 
commercial arbitration [Nottage 2000b]. Even the mainstream media, such as Time Magazine in its 
special issue of 25 September 2000 [Nottage 2000c], appears to have abandoned the strongly 
“culturalist” explanation of Japanese law which guides Konsta’s thesis.
Since coming into effect in October 1998, a scheme involving informal and formal conciliation 
by Ministry of Labour officials in individual employment disputes has been used increasingly, with 
dismissals being the major category of dispute. These processes rely on voluntary settlement brokered 
by government officials, but labour interests now propose that Labor Relations Commissions be allowed 
to rule on the full range of individual labour disputes; see “The Dispute Resolution Support System” 39/10 
Japan Labor Bulletin (2000) <http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vol39-10/05.htm>, and generally 
Nottage 2000d, para JPN ^60-011. Meanwhile, amendments to Japan’s unemployment benefit scheme 
(in effect from April 2001) have reduced payouts to those in their early 60s, and increaised those to 
younger workers who suffer involuntary employment: see “Revision of the Employment Insurance Law” 




























































































employees; and addressing problems of sexual harassment (still a frequent 
source of litigation, since the early 1990s);* 29
•  1995 amendments (in effect from April 1999) to the Child Care Law: extending 
leave to provide care to elderly family members;30
•  1999 amendments to the Working Dispatching Law: abolishing the "positive list" 
system of limiting dispatching to specified (professional) job categories, in favour 
of a "negative list" system; and putting pressure on companies using such 
temporary helpers to offer them employment first if the company decide to hire for 
work done by them (potentially creating a new hybrid category of employees);
•  Simultaneous amendments to the Employment Security Law: also changing to a 
"negative list" system for private placement of non-temporary workers; clearer 
licensing for businesses doing this; and replacement of a blanket fee maximum 
chargeable (which hampered attempts to head-hunt and place managers);31
•  1999 enactment of a Fundamental Law for a Gender-Equal Society (which may 
encourage affirmative action programmes, etc);32
•  moves to promote pension plans based on “defined contributions” pension, rather
Indeed, the first case of sexual harassment by a male: 'Fukuoka Man Settles Sexual 
Harassment Case with Male Boss' Kyodo News Service, 15 January 2001, More generally on the 
responses to heightened awareness of this issue due to litigation and legislative amendments, “Sexual 
Harassment: Actual Inquiries and the Responses of Companies” 39/7 Japan Labor Bulletin (2000) 
<http://www.iil.go.ip/bulletin/vear/2000/vol39-07/02.htm#1>; Nottage 2000d, para JPN H60-004. See also 
warnings published by the Ministry of Labour in June 2000: ‘“ Matters for Special Attention' in Hiring 
Employees by Status” 39/9 Japan Labor Bulletin (2000) <http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vol39- 
09/05. htm#1>
Further amendments, to be submitted to the Diet in 2001 to take effect from April 2002, will 
extend the availability of flex-time work schedules, shorter working hours or exemptions from overtime 
work, to care for children until they turn three (rather than one): “Work and Family” Mainichi Daily News,
29 December 2000.
See generally [Araki 1999]. Further: “According to the Ministry of Labour, from December 1, 
1999 (when the laws came into effect) to June 1, 2000, 293 enterprises offered fee-charging job 
placement services (an increase of 34% compared to the same period in the previous year) and 898 
enterprises were dispatching employees to other firms (an increase of 23%). As of June 1, 2000, the 
number of private fee-charging job placement businesses totalled 3,930, an increase of 8.1 percent from 
the end of November 1999, just before the relevant law was revised. ...The number of enterprises 
engaged in worker dispatching services as of June 1, 2000 totalled 17,277, an increase of 5.5 percent 
from the end of November 1999. ... According to the Special Survey of the Labour Force Survey 
conducted in February [2000] by the Management and Coordination Agency, only 2.8 percent of 
unemployed people rely on private job placement agencies when looking for work. That compares with 
40.1 percent who rely on Public Employment Security Offices. On the other hand, some 900,000 workers 
were dispatched in fiscal 1998, 4.7 percent more than the previous year. Thus, although the private 
sector still plays a minor role in the market, as employment patterns become more varied in the future, 
rapid expansion of private job placement firms is expected. Moreover, since workers can now be 
dispatched to any category of job, it is almost certain that their numbers and significance will increase in 
the near future.” See “Participation in Private Employment Placement Services Increases” 39/10 Japan 
Labor Bulletin (September 2000) <http://www.jil.go.jP/bulletin/year/2000/vol39-09/02.htm#1>. See also 
“2000 Economic Survey of Japan: A New Era Begins” 39/10 Japan Labor Bulletin (2000) 
<http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vol39-10/01.htm>.
Nottage 2000d, para JPN ^60-034. Cf generally “Fundamental Law for a Gender-Equal 
Society” 38/9 Japan Labor Bulletin (1999) <http://www.iil.qo.jP/bulletin/vear/1999/vol38-09/05.htm#1>: 





























































































than just “defined benefits” (which had discouraged voluntary job-switching, 
because complete vesting was unusual).33
In addition to recent changes in the legal environment, and long-standing 
transformations in political economy broadly related to globalisation described at the 
start of this Part, globalisation is also beginning to have a more direct effect on the 
Japanese labour market. In the boom times of the 1980s, many "guest workers" were 
brought in for blue-collar work which Japanese were unwilling to touch. Many have 
stayed on, often illegally. Yet a significant feature of the 1990s has been a slowly 
growing presence of white-collar employees and managers, even at the highest 
executive level. This is most noticeable in the financial sector, but it is tied to broader 
patterns in foreign direct investment, especially Mergers and Acquisitions involving 
companies from abroad [see eg Bonacker 1999, Sibbett 1998]. While it is too early to 
say what independent effect these developments will have on the labour market in 
Japan, cumulatively they reinforce the changes described above, impacting on the 
future of corporate governance in Japan.34
V. Conflicting Tendencies in Industrial Production and the State?
Thus, applying basic principal-agent theory to analyse three key aspects of Japanese 
corporate governance suggests that the interests of managers and shareholder have 
drawn closer together; that severe challenges have emerged for corporate finance 
centred on main banks; but pressures reshaping employment relations may be less 
obvious and consolidate only over the longer term. Overall, this amounts to more 
convergence towards arm's length relations characteristic of Anglo-American 
corporate governance. Further complicating the picture, however, the notion of 
opportunism underlying principal-agent theory may not be the only force at work. This 
become apparent when we look at further stakeholders in the firm.
Another important set of stakeholders, affecting the relations among the 
others described so far, consists of the firm's outside suppliers and customers. 
Particularly intriguing are the cooperative relations which have developed among 
firms, especially in the automobile industry, notably in post-War Japan but later finding 
root in the US. Recent studies of industrial organisation have focused on "learning by 
monitoring" in this industry (and some others), involving: (i) benchmarking (exacting 
surveys of current and likely future products and processes) to uncover new general, 
(ii) simultaneous engineering (where subunits responsible for components undertakes 
similar benchmarking, while considering implications for other subunits, which may
"Cabinet OKs Bill for New Defined-Benefit Pension Plans" Japan Economic Newswire, 19 
February 2001. Although these proposed reforms only address hybrid schemes, even the largest 
Japanese companies have already begun voluntarily recrafting their pension schemes to allow more 
transportability. In 1999, for instance, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co allowed the option of taking 
■retirement benefits in twice-yearly increments while still on the job, rather than in a lump sum at 
retirement. ... More than 40% of new hires have chosen the incremental payments, four times the 
number Matsushita expected": “Individualism Is the Movement of the Moment in Japan: Consensus? 
What Consensus? People Begin to Look to Themselves: 'Be Anglo-Saxon and Succeed'", Asian Wall 
Street Journal, 8-14 January 2001, 6.
By the end of 1998, despite the recession, registered foreign workers had grown a further two 
percent to reach a record high: “Registered Foreigners Exceed 1.5 Million" 38/9 Japan Labor Bulletin 




























































































lead to redefining the project as a whole), and (iii) systems of strict error detection and 
correction for the new routines, with further extensive information sharing to respond 
quickly before consequences become disastrous [Helper, McDuffie & Sabel 2000: 
466], The emergence of this paradigm suggests that pervasive patterns of information 
sharing may entrench norms of cooperation, seen not just as a means of securing 
individual benefits but rather as an end in itself, underpinned by a vision of "enlarging 
the pie" rather than trying to obtain a larger slice at the others' expense. History also 
shows how dramatic changes in conditions may unravel such collaborative relations 
(as in the US automobile industry over the 1950s-70s), but then build them up again 
as underlying mechanisms become apparent (as in the 1980s-90s) [ibid: 476-7],
Little data is available on what has happened to relations among firms in 
Japan's automobile industry, especially in the late 1990s [cf Miwa & Ramseyer 2000], 
when the changes to other aspects of corporate governance described above 
appeared to find more traction. Despite some notable developments,35 the economic 
and social logic underpinning cooperative inter-firm relations may prove resistant in 
this industry. It is demonstrably more successful, and still holds reserves to draw on, 
compared for instance to Japan's weak financial sector. Further, Kashiwagi [2001: 
3.b.v] reports that although Japan's auto manufacturers are now using e-commerce to 
unwind keiretsu or preferential relationships with suppliers for standardised products, 
they are retaining such relationships for more technologically complex parts. Relative 
stasis in such an important production chain would present a tension with the trends 
towards change identified above (Parts ll-IV), even if the latter relations (within the 
firm) are more constitutive of corporate governance. But a similar tension arguably 
characterised the US over the 1980s and 1990s, as contracting among firms (at least 
in some manufacturing and services sectors) became more based on information 
sharing and learning by monitoring, yet arm's length control and market-based 
coordination increasingly characterised corporate governance in its narrower sense 
[Sabel 1995; 1996 = 1998].
The (re-)entrenchment of learning by monitoring mechanisms in the US at the 
level of industrial production, and their possible resilience in Japan,353 may encourage 
the emergence of novel forms of corporate governance in both countries: "corporate 
incubators" for strategic thinking established within firms, performance metrics based 
on baskets of measures subjected to continuous review and redefinition, and venture 
capitalists. However, these applications are less well established than in industrial 
production, and are thought to run more risk of being displaced by more 
straightforward market-based corporate governance mechanisms [Helper et al 2000: 
477-501].
On the other hand, they may also be supported by similar processes of 
learning by monitoring being played out at the level of the state, a further broader 
stakeholder in corporate organisations. An important parallel trend in advanced 
industralised democracies appears to be "democratic experimentalism” [Dorf & Sabel
Japanese automobile makers contracted with 1245 companies in 1994, compared to 298 in 
1987; and bought US$15.5 billion of parts from the US in 1993, six times more than in 1986 [Boyd & 
Schipani 2000: 857]. See also [JETRO 1996; Ishida 1997]; and broader restructuring in the wake of 
Renault's investment in Nissan (above n. 15 and 17). More generally, parts are increasingly procured 
from operations around the world, and almost all Japanese automobile manufacturers have seen 
significant foreign investment since 1996: see
<http://www.meti.qo.ip/enqlish/information/data/cAuto00122e.pdf>.
For an interesting experiment in a different sector, see "IBM Japan Knits Parts Suppliers Into 




























































































1998], involving: (a) central authorities which “create a framework for experimentation 
by defining broad problems, setting provisional standards, pooling measurements of 
local performance, aiding poor performers to correct their problems, and revising 
standards and overall goals according to results”; and (b) “local units doing most of 
the problem-solving but which are “accountable to the center, and to their local 
constituents, who participate in formulating its plans, and judge it both against those 
goals and in comparison to the performance to the performance of other locales in like 
circumstances" [Sabel 2000: 17; see also Gerstenberg & Sabel 2000]. Key 
parameters in experimentation involving the state are again transparency and 
participation by diverse affected actors, to prompt access to - and effective use of - 
information to develop collaborative and effective relations.
Important trends in this direction in Japan nowadays include sweeping 
deregulation programmes, although these have tended to get bogged down in detail 
and bureaucracy [Kawamura 1999]; enactment of comprehensive official information 
disclosure legislation in 1999 [Kadomatsu 1999]; more engagement with foreigners 
and foreign models, although still too reactive and lacking in vision [Clark 2000]; some 
legal recognition of previously marginalised ethnic groups [Levin 2001]; and adroit 
attempts by other minorities to avoid 'bureaucratic capture' while improving their lot 
[Nakamura 2001]. To be sure, steps have been more faltering than in some 
neighbouring countries, like Korea [Ginsburg 2001a]. Yet significant momentum has 
been generated in Japan over the last decade, pointing the way towards more 
sustained polyarchic "deliberative democracy" there too [cf generally Cohen & Sabel 
1997]. This adds further contingencies and difficulties in assessing existing and 
potential changes in Japanese corporate governance. But these more political 
dimensions may prove to be the most crucial, despite having been overlooked by 
most commentators in the debate so far.36 The seeming paralysis of Japanese policy­
makers over the last decade, despite the welter of woeful economic news described in 
the opening quote in this paper, can then be seen in a more positive light. Perhaps it
Recently, however, Fort & Schipani [2000: 865] has advocated various corporate governance 
mechanisms based rather similarly on the firm as "mediating institution", premised on empowerment and 
"participants within the organization [having] the requisite voice and power to have economic and non­
economic concerns expressed and integrated into their business communities".
Further, Ballon and Flonda [2000: xviii (original emphasis)] argue that "the challenge of 
business lies in fostering the capacity to learn and the willingness to learn, namely, to learn from other 
stakeholders about the vagaries of the market, of technology, of administration, and so on, and to learn 
how to overcome the steady obsolescence of skills and physical assets". But their later discussion of the 
"national context", especially of allegedly pervasive "government paternalism" [ibid: 74-9], follows 
conventional wisdom in depicting a system that generates considerable information, but through more 
hierarchical methods involving considerable exclusion of potential participants.
Finally, Roe [eg 1997] has long argued in general terms for the importance of path 
dependency in the national evolution (or otherwise) of corporate governance regimes, and has recently 
applied these insights to analyse lifelong employment in Japan [Gilson and Roe 1999]. However, 
although the starling point is political contingency (like the deal reached between managers and/or 
politicians and a segment of the labour force soon after World W ar II in Japan), the system is then 
reproduced and perhaps (but often not) changed following cost-benefit assessments by actors in the 
circumstances. Mahoney [2000: 517] identifies this sort of approach as a "utilitarian" variant of path 
dependence theory, but points out a number of others. Sabel's approach, and hence that presented in 
Part V of this paper, implies elements also of a "legitimation" variant of path dependency, whereby the 
■institution is reproduced because actors believe it is morally just or appropriate", and is then 




























































































shows important elements of "democratic experimentalism", with (a) central authorities 
slowly reorganising key building blocks after extensive analysis of world-wide trends, 
but (b) leaving it primarily to social-economic sub-units (such as major stakeholders in 
firms including creditors and employees, with their peak assocations) to find a new 
balance and forms of governance combining efficiency with normative acceptability [cf 
eg West 2001b: 31-4, 62]. However, that more positive assessment turns crucially on 
whether the Japanese state is and will remain committed to fostering information flows 
and decentralised participation in decision-making among diverse socio-economic 
groups.
V. Conclusions
Overall, the combination of globalisation, deregulation, and recession in Japan 
throughout the 1990s has generated more systematic change than predicted or 
implied by many proponents of "varieties of capitalism" (cf Part I). To monitor relations 
in central areas of corporate governance straddling key factors of production in 
contemporary economies, such as employees and suppliers of equity or debt capital, 
there have been important shifts towards more arm's length or shareholder-based 
control-oriented strategies. These have occurred primarily in practices and 
expectations, but also (perhaps increasingly) in legislative rules.37 Yet the 
transformations are most pronounced in the stakeholder relationships among 
managers and employees (Part II), and perhaps creditors (Part III), and less obvious - 
but still significant - in labour markets (Part IV). Further, a rather different set of norms
Focusing on social norms, Milhaupt [2001: 31 ] concludes that there are major transformations 
underway in business and government which are pushing Japan towards a shareholder-centred ideology: 
"increased acceptance of the takeover as a legitimate tool of corporate strategy and 
monitoring (and a concomitant reduction of legal and structural impediments to M&A), a 
heightened awareness of shareholders' economic expectations, a change in managerial 
mindset about is proper role in running the firm, diminished social expectations of forbearance 
on the part of banks and their regulators, and rising ambivalence about the benefits of 
seniority-based employment practices. These shifts are palpable and important Indeed, taken 
together with the emerging evidence of parallel norm shifts underway in Europe, they portend 
for the future a much narrower ideological spectrum on how and for whose benefits firms 
should be managed."
However, he continues that:
"the rapidity and extent of Japanese normative convergence towards the Anglo-American 
model should not be overstated. While signs of norm shifts are very recent, evidence of the 
inefficiency of the old norm structure surfaced nearly a decade ago. And signs of norm 
stickiness are abundant."
Milhaupt [ibid: 32] also observes that changes in corporate law appear to have lagged behind significant 
changes in norms, such as new board structures. Yet he notes that such changes have recently been 
tabled. Viewing corporate governance more broadly, moreover, the legislative changes affecting labour 
relations (discussed in Part V of this paper) have come remarkably quickly. Even when focusing on the 
development of corporate law rules, West [2000b] may be overstating "divergence" in post-War Japan 
and the US by focusing on (declining) numbers of “functionally similar" common rules. Although he does 
attempt to break down this quantitative analysis by dividing them into mandatory versus enabling rules, a 
more qualitative judgement as to which of these rules are more important seems essential to judge 
overall divergence versus convergence. Also important is the starting point: the big shift (convergence) to 
more shareholder-oriented rules soon after World War II. Subsequent divergence from this new base-line 




























































































and arrangements may continue to characterise some important sectors of industrial 
production. Driven by information-sharing to develop and maintain trust, this may also 
reflect and support more participatory "democratic experimentalism" in the Japanese 
state (Part V). Such conflicting tendencies at different levels further undermine 
influential theories of "varieties of capitalism", which tend to see high degrees of 
internal consistency within such systems of economic and political ordering. They also 
raise doubts about the suggestion that "high trust” varieties (such as Germany's, but 
perhaps also Japan's) may disintegrate into "low-trust" or market-based varieties 
(arguably, the Anglo-American model), but not vice versa [Hall & Soskice 2000 = 
2001]. Finally, because democratic experimentalism is common to the US and Britain 
as well, a deeper level of convergence appears to be emerging in Japan. But how 
various experiments play out in these countries, especially in reorienting Japanese 
corporate governance in its broadest sense, could well play out quite differently, 
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